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Abstract
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of a land rent tax on capital forma-
tion and foreign investment in a life-cycle small open economy with
endogenous labor-leisure choices. The consequences of land taxation
critically depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the govern-
ment. A land tax depresses capital formation, crowds out foreign
investment and increases national wealth and consumption when the
land tax revenues are distributed as lump-sum payments. If the pro-
ceeds from land taxation are used to finance unproductive government
expenditure, the land tax will be neutral in its eﬀects on the capital
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stock, nonhuman wealth and labor. When the tax revenues are used
to reduce labor taxes, the land rent tax spurs nonhuman wealth accu-
mulation and ambiguously aﬀects the capital stock and labor.
JEL classification: E21, E62, H22.
Keywords: Land Taxation; Labor Supply; Capital Accumulation;
Overlapping-generations.
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1 Introduction
In a non-altruistic OLG closed economy, where land serves as an input as
well as an asset, a tax on land rent is associated with a higher capital stock
and output per person in the steady state. The rationale for this result,
discovered by Feldstein (1977), is that a land tax hike, by initially reducing
the value of land, diverts saving away from land into real capital, therefore
spurring capital accumulation and temporarily output growth. The increase
in the capital stock in turn lowers the real interest rate and raises the marginal
productivity of land as well as the wage rate. Steady state financial wealth,
consumption and welfare rise.
The positive eﬀect of the land rent tax on capital formation, which can
be denominated the ”Feldstein eﬀect”, is grounded in the portfolio choice.
Since capital and land are the only assets of the economy, any ”flight from
land”, determined by the land rent tax, is by necessity a ”flight into real
capital”. The ”Feldstein eﬀect” is independent of alternative uses of land
tax revenues.
There have been many articles analyzing the implications of land rent
taxes for the resource allocation and incidence analysis.1 Calvo, Kotlikoﬀ,
and Rodriguez (1979) demonstrated that the Feldstein findings depend on
1A particular line of research has focused on the consequences of land taxation on the
gestation period of land investment projects. See, for example, Bentick (1979) and Mills
(1981), who showed that a tax on land value favors land uses with early-payoﬀ income
streams.
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the non-Ricardian (in the demographic sense) structure of the economy, by
showing that in a Barro-Ramsey economy, a tax on land rent is fully capi-
talized in the price of land and no eﬀect on capital accumulation occurs, as
originally predicted by Ricardo (1817). Fane (1984) argued that, once a fully
compensated land tax is considered in a finite-lived setup with disconnected
generations, the unique eﬀect of taxation is to cause a fall in the land value
with no shifting; a land tax is fully compensated when the land tax shift
is accompanied by the issuance of perpetual government bonds, whose sale
proceeds are used to make lump-sum transfers to the landlords hit by the
tax, and the land tax revenues are employed to finance the interest payments
on the newly issued government bonds.2 The Ricardian results on the land
tax shifting can also be obtained in a life-cycle setting with no-bequests if
current consumption and future consumption are perfect substitutes in the
individuals’ utility function; see Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1987).
Chamley and Wright (1987) analyzed the dynamic incidence of pure rent
taxation in the Feldstein (1977) model. They found that the impact response
of the land price to an increase in the land tax may be positive or negative.
If positive, this response is always smaller than one-half of the tax revenues;
if instead the price of land falls immediately, the loss in value is never greater
than indicated by the full Ricardian capitalization of the land tax.
In a finite-lived small open economy having unrestricted access to the
world capital market and a fixed labor supply, saving diverted from land by a
2The equivalence between land taxation and government debt has also been demon-
strated by Buiter (1989), who showed, by considering an overlapping generations model
without operative intergenerational gift and bequest motives, that ”debt neutrality” pre-
vails when government debt is accompanied by a tax on land.
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rise in land taxation is not directed towards real capital; under perfect capital
mobility, in fact, the portfolio mechanism discovered by Feldstein implies that
the ”flight from land” necessarily determines a ”flight into foreign assets”.
This was shown by Eaton (1988), who discovered that a land tax leaves the
capital stock, domestic output and non-land input prices unaﬀected.3 The
land tax however reduces the price of land, crowds out foreign investment
and hence raises national income as well as the consumption and welfare of
nationals. There is nothing surprising in the Eaton (1988) findings, since,
even though the economy he analyzed is in principle a three-asset economy
(as net foreign assets enter the asset menu of savers in addition to physical
capital and land), it de facto works as a two-asset economy, since the capital
stock is tied down by the given world interest rate.
By considering a monetary growth model, Ihori (1990) investigated the
role of land taxation in an inflationary OLG economy. He obtained that a
balanced budget rise in land taxation accompanied by an increase in govern-
ment spending induces an increase in the capital stock and a reduction in
factor returns, while a tax reform from lump-sum taxes to land taxes crowds
out capital formation and increases the real return on land and capital. In
all the cases studied by Ihori (1990), the nominal price of land is normally
reduced by land taxes, while the real price may rise or fall.
Hashimoto and Sakuragawa (1998) found in a ”learning by doing” endoge-
nous growth economy with finite horizons that the eﬀects of the imposition
of a land tax diﬀer according to the tax-transfer programme adopted. If the
3The analysis of the land tax eﬀects is only one of the several issues investigated by
Eaton (1988) in an open economy with reproducible capital and unimproved land.
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tax revenues are wasted or transferred wholly to the younger generations,
the growth rate is always increased by pure rent taxes, whereas if they are
transferred wholly to the older generations, the output growth rate may be
reduced.
None of these articles has analyzed the implications of endogenous labor-
leisure decisions for the macroeconomic consequences of land taxation. As
originally recognized by Feldstein (1977),4 the labor supply responses may
strongly aﬀect the incidence of a pure rent tax because of the income ef-
fects that can arise according to the compensatory financing adopted by the
government.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the eﬀects of a land tax on cap-
ital formation and foreign investment in a life-cycle small open economy with
perfect capital mobility, where the supply of labor is endogenous. We find
that the consequences of land rent taxation diﬀer substantially from those
predicted by Feldstein (1977), Eaton (1988), and the others, and critically
depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the government.
Land taxation does not spur capital accumulation as in a closed economy,
but instead depresses capital formation and economic growth when the tax
revenues are lump-sum transferred to consumers. Labor supply and domestic
output are reduced by the shock, while nonhuman wealth and national in-
come are increased. If, instead, the proceeds from land taxation were used to
finance unproductive government expenditure, the tax on pure rent would be
neutral in its eﬀects on the capital stock and aggregate wealth. In this case,
the reduction in the land price stemming from higher taxation only implies
4See pp. 350 and 357.
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a compensating decrease in foreign investment. When the tax proceeds are
used to cut labor income taxes, land taxation ambiguously aﬀects the labor
supply and the capital stock, while it raises domestic wealth and aggregate
consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the analytical frame-
work. Section 3 investigates the steady state consequences of land taxation
under diﬀerent compensatory financing schemes. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a small open economy producing a single tradable good, which is
perfectly substitutable with the foreign-produced good, and having access to
a perfect world capital market. Domestic production is obtained by using
capital, land and labor. Domestic assets, namely real capital and land, are
partly owned by nationals and partly by foreigners.
The consumers’ behavior is obtained by using the OLG demographics
with uncertain lifetime and no bequest motives formulated by Yaari (1965)
and Blanchard (1985), extended to incorporate endogenous labor-leisure choices,
as in Phelps (1994, ch. 16).5 Agents face a constant mortality rate θ. New co-
horts are born continuously. As the birth rate is assumed to equal the death
5The analysis of Feldstein (1977), Chamley and Wright (1987), and Eaton (1988) are in-
stead based on the Diamond-Samuelson specification of the overlapping-generations struc-
ture, in which two generations are alive in each period and members of diﬀerent generations
are distinguished explicitly. The adoption of the Blanchard-Yaari continuous-time OLG
setup, which does not distinguish members of diﬀerent generations explicitly, is inconse-
quential for the main qualitative results of our analysis.
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rate, population, composed of cohorts of diﬀerent ages, remains constant and
hence can be normalized to one.
Assuming that the individual utility is logarithmic in consumption, c,
and leisure, 1− l (where l represents the labor hours supplied and the time
endowment has been normalized to one), at each instant t a consumer born
at time s ≤ t solves the following problem
max
] ∞
t
{α ln c(s, j) + (1− α) ln [1− l(s, j)]} exp[−(θ + ρ)(j − t)]dj (1)
subject to the instantaneous budget constraint
c(s, t) +
d
dt
vd(s, t) = (r∗ + θ)vd(s, t) + (1− τ)w(t)l(s, t) + z(s, t), (2)
and the solvency condition precluding Ponzi schemes
lim
j→∞
vd(j, t) exp[−(r∗ + θ)(j − t)] = 0, (3)
where vd(s, t) and z(s, t) denote nonhuman wealth and lump-sum transfers
of a consumer born at time s; w(t) is the hourly real wage, ρ the rate of
time preference (exogenous), r∗ the world interest rate (exogenous), τ the
proportional tax on labor income, and α " (0, 1) a preference parameter.
The optimality conditions for the individual problem (1)-(3) are
c(s, t) = α(θ + ρ)[vd(s, t) + h(s, t)],
1− l(s, t) = (1− α)c(s, t)
α(1− τ)w(t) ,
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ddt
c(s, t) = (r∗ − ρ)c(s, t),
where h(s, t) is the consumer’s human wealth, given by
h(s, t) =
] ∞
t
[(1− τ)w(j) + z(s, j)] exp[−(r∗ + θ)(j − t)]dj.
Aggregating over all the cohorts and omitting the time index, the demand-
side of the model can be expressed as
C = α(θ + ρ)(V d +H), (4a)
1− L = (1− α)C
α(1− τ)w, (4b)
.
H= (r
∗ + θ)H − (1− τ)w − Z, (4c)
C+
.
V
d
= r∗V d + (1− τ)wL+ Z, (4d)
where capital letters denote aggregate variables of the corresponding individ-
ual ones.6 Equation (4a) describes the life-cycle consumption function, (4b)
is the Cobb-Douglas labor supply, (4c) gives the dynamics of human wealth,
and (4d) represents the consumers’ aggregate budget constraint, which de-
scribes the dynamics of nonhuman wealth.
By using equations (4), the Blanchard-Yaari law of motion for consump-
tion can be obtained:
6Each aggregate variable is defined asX =
U t
−∞ x(s, t)θe
θ(s−t)ds, where x(s, t) indicates
a generic individual variable.
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.C= (r∗ − ρ)C − αθ(θ + ρ)V d. (4a’)
The financial wealth of domestic residents is composed of two perfectly
substitutable assets, i.e. physical capital Kd and unimproved land T d; that
is
V d = Kd + qT d,
where q is the price of land. As the stock of financial wealth held by nationals
is strictly positive, the steady state equilibrium requires r∗ > ρ.
After-tax rates of return of perfectly substitutable assets must satisfy the
following relationship
r∗ =
(1− λ)R
q
+
.
q
q
, (5)
where λ is a proportional tax rate on land rent, and R the land rent; perfect
foresight has been assumed.
Domestic output Y is produced by competitive firms through a well-
behaved and linearly homogeneous production function: Y = F (K,T,L),
where K and T represent total capital stock and land, respectively. Factors
of production are complementary in the Edgeworth sense.
Total capital and land are defined as
K = Kd +Kf , (6a)
T = T d + T f , (6b)
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where Kf and T f are capital and land owned by foreigners, respectively.
First-order conditions for maximum profit entail
FK(K,T, L) = r
∗, (7a)
FT (K,T,L) = R, (7b)
FL(K,T,L) = w. (7c)
The economy has a fixed endowment of unimproved land,
∼
T , fully used in
production. Land endowment is normalized to one, i.e.
∼
T= 1.
The government uses revenues from taxing land rents and labor income to
finance lump-sum transfers to consumers and unproductive public spending
G;7 that is
λRT + τwL = Z +G. (8)
The current account gives the rate of accumulation of foreign investment:
.
B= C+
.
K +G− Y + r∗B, (9)
where B denotes foreign investment, i.e. capital and land owned by foreign-
ers, defined as
B = Kf + qT f . (10)
7G does not aﬀect the productive capacity of the economy as well as consumption and
labor supply decisions. If however G entered the agent instantaneous utility function,
our analysis would remain unchanged provided that individual preferences are additively
separable in consumption and leisure, on the one hand, and public expenditure, on the
other.
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The full model of the economy is obtained by combining the optimality
conditions for consumers and firms together with the equilibrium condition
on factor markets and the relevant equations of accumulation.
Our study of the macroeconomic consequences of land taxation is only
concerned with the steady state equilibrium.
3 Land taxation and resource allocation
Three alternative policy-experiments concerning the eﬀects of a parametric
change in λ are studied: one in which the government distributes the rev-
enues from taxation in a lump-sum fashion, one in which the additional tax
proceeds are used for financing an increase in the public expenditure, and
one in which land tax revenues are employed to reduce the labor income tax
rate.
3.1 Lump-sum distribution of land tax revenues
In this experiment, the rise in the land tax is accompanied by the lump-sum
distribution of the land tax proceeds. Government expenditure and the labor
income tax rate remain fixed at
∼
G and
∼τ respectively.
The marginal productivity of capital is fixed by the world interest rate.
From (7a), we obtain
L= l(K), l
 > 0, (11)
where overbars denote long-run values and l = −FKK
FKL
> 0. An increase in
the capital stock, by reducing the marginal productivity of capital, requires
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an increase in labor so as to keep the real rate of return on capital fixed at r∗.
Plugging (11) into (7b) and (7c), we obtain that R= R(K) and w= w(K),
where R =
L Φ
FKL
> 0, w = − Φ
FKL
< 0, and Φ = FKKFLL − F 2KL > 0.
Substituting (11) into (4b) for L, we can express consumption in terms
of the capital stock and the labor income tax rate as follows
C= c(K,
∼τ), c
K
< 0, c∼τ < 0, (12)
where c
K
= −
α(1− ∼τ )
k
(1− L)Φ− FLFKK
l
(1− α)FKL
< 0, and c∼τ = −
α(1− L)FL
(1− α) <
0. This equation gives, for any level of the capital stock and the wage tax
rate, the level of consumption compatible with the labor market equilibrium.
From (4a’), the Blanchard-Yaari consumption function is derived
C=
αθ(θ + ρ)
(r∗ − ρ)

K + q − B

, (13)
where K + q − B=V d .8
The current account balance implies that
C +
∼
G= r∗

K + q − B

+ FL L +λFT . (14)
This equation states that the long-run aggregate demand, given by private
consumption plus the government spending, is equal to national income.
Alternatively, (14) can be re-written, by using the government budget
constraint (8), as
8Equation (13) represents the life-cycle consumption function since it is obtained from
(4a), once the long-run expression for human wealth from (4b), and the private budget
constraint (4d) have been used.
13
C= r∗

K + q − B

+ (1− ∼τ )FL L + Z . (15)
This relationship is the consumers’ budget constraint, which says that in the
steady state, consumption is equal to the disposable income.
Substituting (13) into (14) for K + q − B and using (11), we obtain
C=
αθ(θ + ρ)
[αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)]

h(K,λ)−
∼
G

, (16)
where h(K,λ) = FL L +λFT , hK = −
k
(1− λ) L Φ+ FLFKK
l
FKL
, hλ = FT > 0
and αθ(θ + ρ) > r∗(r∗ − ρ).9 Equation (16) describes, for given levels of
the capital stock, the land tax rate and the government expenditure, the
corresponding consumption compatible with the current account balance and
the life-cycle consumption decisions.
Diﬀerentiating (12) and (16) yields10
d C
dλ
=
αθ(θ + ρ)FT cK
∆
,
d K
dλ
=
αθ(θ + ρ)FT
∆
,
where ∆ = [αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] c
K
− αθ(θ + ρ)h
K
.
9The sign of the latter inequality is inferred from the following relationship
αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ) =
(r∗ − ρ)
k
(1− ∼τ )FL L + Z
l

K + q − B
 > 0.
This equation is obtained by combining (13) with (15).
10The labor and nonhuman wealth multipliers are easily obtained by using the expres-
sions for
d K
dλ
and
d C
dλ
together with (11) and (13), respectively.
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Saddle-point stability of the steady state equilibrium is satisfied as long
as ∆ < 0.11 Thus, a rise in the land tax leads to a higher consumption and a
lower capital stock. The rise in consumption is accompanied by an expansion
of national wealth from (13), while the reduction in the capital stock goes
together with a contraction in the labor supply from (11).12 The drop in the
capital stock implies that the before-tax return on land falls, while the wage
rate rises. The price of land falls more than the capitalized amount of the
tax because of the reduction of the marginal productivity of land. Moreover,
since domestic wealth K + q is reduced and national wealth K + q − B is
increased, a reduction of foreign investment takes place.
The consequences of λ on consumption, national wealth and the capital
stock (and hence on all the other endogenous variables) are due to the ex-
porting of the tax burden to non-residents as well as the intergenerational
wealth transfer. The role of these mechanisms can be explained as follows.
The land taxes fall on both nationals and foreigners, but the land tax rev-
enues go entirely to nationals. Thus, the land taxation raises the disposable
income and hence consumption of nationals, since at an aggregate level they
11The dynamic properties of the model are discussed in an unpublished Mathematical
Supplement, available from the author upon request. A suﬃcient condition for ∆ to be
negative is h
K
> 0; the condition h
K
>0 is reasonably satisfied as it plausibly requires that
an increase in the capital stock raises total labor income and land tax revenues.
12Notice that, despite our results are formulated in terms of the capital stock (this is done
to facilitate the comparability with the analysis of Feldstein, 1977, Chamley and Wright,
1987, and Eaton, 1988), the casual mechanism that drives capital formation depends,
as will be explained below, on the response of the labor supply to changes in λ; the
capital stock simply adjusts to changes in the labor supply in order to keep the marginal
productivity of capital fixed at r∗.
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pay land taxes in amount λ T
d
FT and receive λFT as government lump-sum
transfers. The rents λ T
f
FT , which are shifted from foreigners to domestic
residents, represent the exporting of the tax burden.13 The portion of the
lump-sum transfers equal to λ T
d
FT , which exactly compensates nationals
for the aggregate taxes they pay, instead, redistributes income intergenera-
tionally from those who consume more and save less to those who consume
less and save more, increasing per se aggregate saving, national wealth and
consumption.
The higher consumption in turn induces a higher demand for leisure and
a lower supply of labor. Manhours are therefore reduced. Since the marginal
product of capital is given, and labor and capital are Edgeworth comple-
ments, the lower labor hours imply a lower capital stock. The decline in the
marginal product of land follows from the decline in the labor supply and
the capital stock. The wage rate increases because of the decline in the labor
supply more than it oﬀsets the decline in the marginal product of labor due
to the decline in the capital stock.
Notice that if land taxation is introduced ex novo (i.e. λ is initially zero),
the consequences of the land tax are to be attributed to the tax exporting
eﬀect for a proportion T
f
and to the intergenerational redistribution mech-
13In open economies using capital and land, the tax exporting eﬀect may lead policy-
makers to set the land tax ineﬃciently at too high a rate with the scope of exploiting
absentee land owners and the capital tax at too low a rate in order to avoid distortions
in the allocation of mobile capital. Lee (2003), instead, shows that a uniform taxation of
land and capital is to be preferred from a normative standpoint since it makes it possible
to alleviate the ineﬃciency of overtaxing land and overproviding public goods.
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anism for a proportion T
d
.14
3.2 Compensatory increase in government expenditure
When land tax revenues are used to finance an increase in government expen-
diture, the implications of the land tax can be easily understood as follows.
Using (15) together with (13), we obtain
C=
αθ(θ + ρ)
[αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)]

j(K,
∼τ)+
∼
Z

, (17)
14This decomposition of the eﬀects of λ can be demonstrated as follows. Suppose that
only foreigners have to pay taxes on land ownership. In this case, (5) and (8) must be
respectively replaced by the equations: qr∗ = (1−λT f )R+
.
q, and λRT f + τwL = Z +G.
Therefore, (14) becomes
C +
∼
G= r
∗

K + q − B

+ FL L +λ T
f
FT . (14’)
Substituting (13) into (14’), and using (11), we obtain
C=
αθ(θ + ρ)
[αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)]
k
h(K,λ T
f
)−
∼
G
l
, (16’)
where h(K,λ T
f
) = FL L +λ T
f
FT .
Diﬀerentiating (12) and (16’) and supposing that the land tax is initially zero, yields
d C
dλ
=
T
f
[αθ(θ + ρ)FT cK ]
∆ > 0, and
d K
dλ
=
T
f
[αθ(θ + ρ)FT ]
∆ < 0.
These multipliers (as well as all the other ones) are equal to T
f
multiplied by the multipliers
obtained under the hypothesis of land taxation borne by both nationals and foreigners.
Thus, this demonstrates that the tax exporting is responsible for a proportion T
f
of the
total long-run eﬀects of land taxation. The intergenerational wealth transfer, instead,
explains the residual proportion T
d
= 1− T
f
of the total steady state eﬀects of land taxes.
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where j(K,
∼τ ) = (1− ∼τ)FL L, jK = −
(1− ∼τ)(L Φ+ FLFKK)
FKL
, j∼τ = −FL L<
0, and
∼
Z represents the exogenous lump-sum transfers. This equation gives,
for given levels of the capital stock, the wage tax rate and lump-sum trans-
fers, the level of consumption planned by Blanchard-Yaari agents, which is
compatible with the consumer budget constraint.
Equations (12) and (17), which jointly determine C and K, are inde-
pendent of λ and G. Hence, a rise in the land tax rate accompanied by
an increase in the government spending leaves consumption and the capital
stock unchanged. National wealth, labor hours, the before-tax land reward
and the wage rate also remain unaﬀacted. As the gross land rental R is
constant, the land price drops by exactly the fall in 1− λ . Hence, the land
rent tax is fully capitalized in the price of land.
Since the capital stock does not change and the price of land is reduced,
foreign investment must fall in order to keep national wealth constant. More-
over, while domestic output remains constant, national income is increased.
The increase in national income is entirely absorbed by the government. The
welfare of nationals remains unaltered.15
Thus, when the government budget is balanced through the endogenous
adjustment of the government expenditure, financial wealth, consumption,
labor hours and the capital stock are independent of the land tax, since
the intergenerational redistribution of income seen above is absent and the
15If welfare-improving government spending entered the instantaneous utility function
of consumers in a strongly separable manner with respect to consumption and leisure, the
land tax shift would increase the nationals’ welfare; however, the ’positive’ macroeconomic
eﬀects of λ just described would be unaltered, as the structural model is unchanged.
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shifting of the tax burden to foreigners does not matter as the government
expenditure does not aﬀect consumption or leisure choices.
3.3 Compensatory reduction in τ
Suppose now that the increase in the land tax is matched by the endogenous
change in the labor tax rate so as to keep the government budget balanced.
Using the government budget constraint (8) together with (7) and (11),
we obtain
d τ
dλ
= − FT
FL L
+Π
d K
dλ
,
where Π =
k
τ (L Φ+ FLFKK)− λ L Φ
l
FL L FKL
.16
From (12) and (16), after using the above expression for
d τ
dλ
, we get
d C
dλ
=
(1− τ)αθ(θ + ρ)FLFTFKK
(1− α) L ΛFKL
,
d K
dλ
= −
αFT
k
θ(θ + ρ)(α− L)− (1− L)r∗(r∗ − ρ)
l
(1− α) L Λ
,
where Λ = [αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] (c
K
+Πcτ)− αθ(θ + ρ)hK and α >L .
Thus, a rise in the land tax exerts a positive eﬀect on consumption and
an ambiguous eﬀect on the capital stock, since Λ < 0, as a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for having saddle-point stability of the steady state.17
The eﬀects on manhours, the pre-tax land reward and the wage rate are
16If a Cobb-Douglas production function were used, Π would be unambiguously negative.
17This is demonstrated in the unpublished Mathematical Supplement.
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also ambiguous.18 Financial wealth is instead pulled up by the rise in land
taxation.
The ambiguity of the land tax eﬀects on capital and labor depends on two
contrasting eﬀects that are at work in this experiment. These eﬀects derive
from a composite income eﬀect (due to the exporting of the tax burden and
the intergenerational wealth transfer), on the one hand, and the consumption-
leisure substitution eﬀect, on the other hand.
The higher λ, by inducing a reduction in the wage income tax, redistrib-
utes income across non-residents and nationals as well as the living gener-
ations and the future ones. Both these redistributive mechanisms lead to
an increase in the stock of financial wealth and consumption.19 The higher
consumption drives the labor supply down; the capital stock declines. On
the other hand, the increase in the after-tax wage, due to the reduction in
τ , brings about a fall in the leisure-consumption ratio. This causes a substi-
tution away from leisure towards labor and consumption. The induced rise
in the labor supply stimulates capital from (11). Thus, the overall eﬀect of
the land tax hike on the labor supply and the capital stock is determined by
which one of these two eﬀects dominates.
From a mechanical perspective, it can be observed that, since consump-
tion and the after-tax wage are increased, the net eﬀect on labor and hence
18Notice once again that, although the results are formulated in terms of K, the labor
supply responses to the exogenous shift are responsible for the changes in the capital stock
and factor prices.
19The tax exporting and intergenerational mechanisms, brought into action by the com-
pensatory change in τ , are the same as those activated when lump-sum transfers are
accommodated.
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the capital stock depends, according to (4b), on whether the consumption-
to-after-tax-wage ratio increases or not. If the eﬀect of the higher land tax on
C
(1− τ) w is positive, namely consumption rises more than the net wage, la-
bor supply is reduced and the capital stock contracts, since the income eﬀect
(stemming from the tax exporting and the intergenerational mechanisms)
dominates the substitution eﬀect; in this case, the qualitative consequences
on the whole system are the same as those seen in Sub-section 3.1. If, in-
stead, the after-tax wage rate increases more than consumption, the labor
supply is stimulated as the magnitude of the substitution eﬀect prevails over
the magnitude of the income eﬀect; the rise in manhours in turn increases
the capital stock. Foreign investment may either rise or fall.
4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the consequences of land taxes in a small open
economy of wealth formation, where the rate of return on capital is exoge-
nously determined on the world capital market, consumers are finite-lived,
and the supply of labor is endogenous. This latter feature diﬀerentiates our
analysis from the previous articles on land taxation, which have instead as-
sumed inelastic labor choices.
A variable labor supply alters the conventional conclusions regarding the
long-run incidence of land taxes. The final eﬀects of land taxation on the
resource allocation, wealth formation and economic growth depend upon the
government uses of the tax proceeds; in our analysis the land tax revenues
are alternatively employed to increase lump-sum transfers, the government
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expenditure, or to cut wage taxes.
Land taxation increases consumption and stimulates wealth formation,
but reduces the capital stock and manhours, when the tax revenues are
distributed as lump-sum payments. The exporting of the tax burden to
non-residents (who do not receive government transfers) and the intergener-
ational wealth transfer (due to the fact that changes in lump-sum payments,
by altering the distribution of resources across heterogeneous generations,
modify aggregate saving and nonhuman wealth) are the basic mechanisms
that underpin these eﬀects.
A rise in the land tax, whose proceeds are used to finance an increase in
the government spending, produces no consequences on consumption, wealth,
labor hours, and capital formation, since the intergenerational redistribution
of resources seen in the case of lump-sum compensatory finance does not
occur and the tax exporting does not matter, as the government spending
leaves consumption and the labor supply choices unaﬀected.
Finally, a revenue-neutral tax reform that reduces labor income taxes
in favor of land taxes raises consumption and national wealth, but exerts
ambiguous eﬀects on labor and the capital stock as the international and
integenerational redistributive mechanisms conflict with a substitution eﬀect
due to the increase in the after-tax wage rate.
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MATHEMATICAL SUPPLEMENT
(not to be published)
Appendix A
Lump-sum distribution of tax revenues: Analysis of stability
The short-run model can be written as
.
C= (r
∗ − ρ)C − αθ(θ + ρ)(K + q −B) (A.1a)
.
q= r∗q − (1− λ)FT (K,L) (A.1b)
.
B=
.
K +C +G− F (K,L) + r∗B (A.1c)
1− L = (1− α)C
α(1− ∼τ)FL(K,L)
(A.1d)
FK(K,L) = r
∗ (A.1e)
Since we are considering the case of a lump-sum distribution of tax
revenues, lump-sum transfers are obtained residually from the relationship:
Z = λFT (K,L)+
∼τ FL(K,L)L−
∼
G.
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Equations (A.1d) and (A.1e) can be solved, once linearized around the
steady state, for L and K in terms of the dynamic variable C to yield
L = n(C), n < 0 (A.2a)
K = k(C), k < 0 (A.2b)
where n =
(1− α)FKK
Σ
= lk =
l
c
K
< 0, k = −(1− α)FKL
Σ
=
1
c
K
< 0,
Σ = α(1− τ)[(1− L)Φ− FLFKK ] > 0 and Φ = FKKFLL − F 2KL > 0.20
Substituting out the values of L and K from equations (A.2) into equa-
tions (A.1a)-(A.1c),21 the model can be reduced to the following system of
diﬀerential equations linearized around the steady state


.
C
.
q
.
B


=


j11 −αθ(θ + ρ) αθ(θ + ρ)
−(1− λ)Q r∗ 0
j31 −αθ(θ + ρ)k r∗ + αθ(θ + ρ)k




C− C
q− q
B− B


(A.3)
where
j11 = r
∗ − ρ− αθ(θ + ρ)k > 0;
Q = FTKk
 + FTLn
 =
L Φ
c
K
FKL
< 0;
j31 = 1− r∗k − FLn + j11k.
20The expressions for l3 and c
K
, given in Sub-section 3.1, are:
l3 = −FKK
FKL
> 0 and c
K
= −
α(1− ∼τ )
k
(1− L)Φ− FLFKK
l
(1− α)FKL
< 0.
21Note that equation (A.2b) is employed, once linearized, to eliminate both K and
.
K
from equations (A.1a)-(A.1c).
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The transition matrix must have two positive eigenvalues associated with
the jump variables C and q, and one negative eigenvalue associated with the
predetermined variable B.22
The determinant and the trace of the above Jacobian are
| J |= −r∗αθ(θ + ρ)
+
1− r
∗(r∗ − ρ)
αθ(θ + ρ)
− 1
c
K
[lFL −
(1− λ) L Φ
FKL
]
,
;
tr(J) = 3r∗ − ρ > 0.
The determinant must be negative as a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for saddle-point stability since the trace is necessarily positive. This condition
implies that, once the relationship lFL −
(1− λ) L Φ
FKL
= h
K
=
= −
k
(1− λ) L Φ+ FLFKK
l
FKL
is taken taken into account, the following in-
equality must hold
∆ = [αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] c
K
− αθ(θ + ρ)h
K
< 0.
Therefore the condition ∆ < 0 ensures that the steady state equilibrium is
saddle-point stable as stated in Sub-section 3.1.
22Since C adjusts on impact, K (hence L) jumps instantaneously as well, provided we
assume, as in Mundell (1957) and Obstfeld (1989), that capital is instantaneously and
costlessly mobile across borders. By considering foreign investment B = Kf + qT f a
predetermined variable, we are implictly assuming that as q moves repentinely Kf adjusts
instantaneously as well, but in an opposite direction so as to leave B unchanged on impact
(note that T f is also predetermined).
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Appendix B
Compensatory reduction in τ : Analysis of stability
The complete short-run model is given by
.
C= (r∗ − ρ)C − αθ(θ + ρ)(K + q −B) (B.1a)
.
q= r∗q − (1− λ)FT (K,L) (B.1b)
.
B=
.
K +C +G− F (K,L) + r∗B (B.1c)
1− L = (1− α)C
α(1− τ)FL(K,L)
(B.1d)
FK(K,L) = r
∗ (B.1e)
τ = τ(K) (B.1f)
where τ  = Π =
k
τ (L Φ+ FLFKK)− λ L Φ
l
FL L FKL
.
Equation (B.1f) has been obtained by solving the government budget
constraint for τ .23
Equations (B.1d) and (B.1e) can be solved, after linearizing around the
steady state and taking (B.1f) into account, for L and K in terms of C as
follows
23The exogenous eﬀect of λ on τ has been omitted for simplicity.
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L = v(C), v < 0 (B.2a)
K = κ(C), κ < 0 (B.2b)
where v = lκ = l

(c
K
+Πcτ)
< 0, κ = 1
(c
K
+Πcτ)
< 0,
c
K
= −
α(1− ∼τ)
k
(1− L)Φ− FLFKK
l
(1− α)FKL
< 0, cτ = −
α(1− L)FL
(1− α) < 0
and Φ = FKKFLL − F 2KL > 0.
Substituting out the values of L and K from equations (B.2) into equa-
tions (B.1a)-(B.1c), the model can be reduced to the following system of
diﬀerential equations linearized around the steady state


.
C
.
q
.
B


=


j11 −αθ(θ + ρ) αθ(θ + ρ)
−(1− λ)Q r∗ 0
j31 −αθ(θ + ρ)κ r∗ + αθ(θ + ρ)κ




C− C
q− q
B− B


(B.3)
where
j11 = r
∗ − ρ− αθ(θ + ρ)κ > 0;
Q = FTKκ + FTLv =
L Φ
(c
K
+Πcτ)FKL
< 0;
j31 = 1− r∗κ − FLv + j11κ.
The transition matrix must admit two positive eigenvalues associated
with C and q and one negative eigenvalue associated with B.
Since the trace of the coeﬃcient matrix in (B.3) is positive, the determi-
nant, given by
| J |= −r∗αθ(θ+ρ)
+
1− r
∗(r∗ − ρ)
αθ(θ + ρ)
− 1
(c
K
+Πcτ)
[lFL −
(1− λ) L Φ
FKL
]
,
,
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must be negative. This condition is satisfied if the following expression
Λ = [αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] (c
K
+Πcτ )− αθ(θ + ρ)hK < 0
is, as stated in Subsection 3.3, negative.24
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